Abstract This paper studies the dynamics of learning in a model of technology adoption. Firms learn about an unknown technology by observing both private and public signals. Because of the externality associated with the public signal, the social planner has firms experiment more in the initial period of the model, relative to the market equilibrium. In certain cases, this more rapid generation of information results in the planner experimenting less in later periods of the model. In contrast, typical models with public signals result in the planner inducing more experimentation in all periods of the model relative to the market equilibrium.
Introduction
When a new technology is introduced into the marketplace, firms typically are unsure about its true quality. Over time, firms learn through direct and indirect means how the new technology compares with the old, existing one. The technology adoption literature has studied the diffusion of information under restrictive I would like to thank Matt Mitchell and Tom Holmes for their advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank Thor Koeppl, Cyril Monnet, John Stevens, and Jason Cummins, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This paper is the second chapter of my dissertation. informational constraints. Firms either all hold the same beliefs about the new technology, or they hold heterogeneous beliefs but learn and act in isolation. As shown in the herding literature however, the combination of both heterogeneous beliefs and learning from others creates interesting and potent effects on the sequential generation of information in an economy. This paper adds to the literature by constructing a dynamic model of technology adoption that incorporates both heterogeneous beliefs and social learning and by studying the speed of adoption within such an environment.
The model in this paper embeds the classic two-armed bandit problem into a finite-period equilibrium model of technology adoption. 1 The adoption decision that firms face is to determine which technology, or arm, to use to produce output each period. One arm represents the "old" technology and has a known, deterministic output distribution common to all players. The second arm represents the "new" technology and has an unknown, stochastic output distribution common to all players. The mean output of the stochastic technology, however, can be either higher or lower than that of the deterministic technology. There are no costs to operating either technology, nor are there costs to switching from one technology to the other between periods.
This model departs from the usual two-armed bandit analysis through its informational structure. I assume that agents can observe only their own individual output and a noisy signal of aggregate output. Experimenting with the new technology and observing individual output conveys the usual learning-by-doing effect. As firms can observe only their own output, this learning-by-doing effect is a private signal that generates heterogeneous beliefs among firms.
In contrast to the individual, private aspect of experimentation, the noisy signal of aggregate output is a public signal observed by all agents. Aggregate quantity contains useful information as its value depends upon the true mean of the stochastic technology. Because it is observed by all firms regardless of their actions, the public signal creates an informational externality. Unlike the typical bandit problem, however, the public signal is not an ad hoc specification but a function of the model equilibrium and the distribution of firms' beliefs. As the informational value of the public signal varies with the measure of firms that experiment with the new technology, the learning interaction among firms is tied to economic fundamentals. A key feature of the public signal is the increase in its informational value as the measure of adopting firms rises.
To solve the firm's problem in this rich informational environment, I define an anonymous sequential game (ASG). 2 I then prove that firms, who can hold different beliefs about the expected output of the new technology, follow cutoff rules as their technology adoption strategy. To determine whether firms experiment efficiently, I define the social planner's problem. Because firms hold heterogeneous beliefs and there is aggregate uncertainty, I cannot formulate a classic planner's problem that maximizes expected aggregate quantity. So instead, I define an uninformed social planner's problem, where the planner seeks to maximize each firm's expected output conditional on the firm being no worse off relative to the market
